There has been much new research on the extent to which the identities, beliefs and practises of ordinary citizens changed after 1917, and whether people were 'becoming Soviet'. This emphasis has tended to underplay continuities. This article uses the personal accounts of former nobles to examine levels of change and continuity in their activities and beliefs in the interwar period.
7 their content remains governed by the interviewers' own preoccupations. 25 There is much to be learned from assessing how former nobles portrayed and understood their own experiences.
Revolution and Civil War, 1917 War, -1921 The Soviet state that emerged from the October Revolution of 1917 was a self-styled 'proletarian state' founded on the principle of class struggle and the hegemony of the working classes. The
Bolsheviks attacked the nobility immediately after seizing power as the obvious example of an obsolete, exploitative and privileged group. On 11 November 1917, the nobility was abolished as a social estate, along with its organizations and its property. Decrees nationalizing land, industry and banks attacked noble landownership and finances. Nobles disappeared into a mass of 'former people' [byvshie liudi] -former bureaucrats, landowners, officers, industrialists and 'bourgeois'
elements -who were attacked due to their privileged positions under the tsarist regime. Nobles recall frequent seizures of property, evictions and arrests throughout this period.
In 1918, as a 'non-toiling' social group, nobles were amongst those denied the right to vote by the new constitution (a group known as lishentsy). In reality there was little worth voting for, but lishentsy suffered practical discrimination in everyday life; they were more likely to lose access to employment, housing, education and state aid (rations and medical benefits especially), and were forced to pay higher taxes and rates. They were arrested, imprisoned, exiled and subjected to forced labour. Further amendments to the constitution in 1924 and 1926 explicitly targeted not only those who were currently living from 'hired labour' or 'unearned income', but those who had done prior to the revolution to combat the fact that many former people had since been forced into 'toiling' occupations. 26 Nobles only formed a small proportion of lishentsy, who in turn were only a minority of the whole population (1-10% at various times). 27 Lishentsy could 8 appeal against being disenfranchised and thousands did, with many successes (25-50% of those appealing). Few former nobles appealed, however. Definitions of a kulak or trader were ambiguous and could be challenged; it was much harder to contest adverse social origins. 28 Many of these problems were universal; all social groups struggled with housing, food and jobs during this period. But there is no doubt that nobles were more susceptible to arrest and imprisonment, especially as they had an ambiguous relationship to the new state. Many males fought against the Bolsheviks in the White Armies, whilst many others hoped that the regime would collapse sooner rather than later. The accounts reflect these sentiments; the immediate, short-term need to survive was matched with the expectation and hope that the Bolshevik regime would not last. Yet the regime, against all odds, continued to hang on to power and state-led repression further increased from the end of 1918. Increasingly nobles took advantage of the chaos to flee to areas held by the Whites or to escape abroad. These nobles never intended to build a life in Soviet Russia. Irina Elenevskaia (b. 1897) and other members of her family, for example, found jobs and shared a flat in Petrograd. The 'whole purpose' of their existence, though, was to escape to Finland as soon as possible and their life in the city was 'simply a necessary evil.' 29 She served on the housing committee, but only to facilitate selling her uncle's furniture for money that could go towards the escape plans that were finally realised in 1920.
This was the stereotypical picture of the nobility that has remained with historians: repressed by the new regime, the Whites defeated, nobles fled the country, forming a large part of the voluminous emigration that spread across Europe, America and the world.
Many nobles, however, could not or did not want to leave their homeland. These nobles stress that they had to make a choice; they had to adapt to the new conditions and ideology or they would disappear into the dregs of society. Ekaterina Meshcherskaia (1904 Meshcherskaia ( -1995 had enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle prior to 1917, but most of this, apart from some jewels, was lost during the revolution. Her father was dead, her brother imprisoned, whilst she and her mother were left 'dazed' by events, living with friends, and distrusting and hating the new regime. Her mother, though, was determined not to be one of those 'shameful' and 'repulsive' nobles who resigned themselves to their fate, selling valuables on the black market, sinking into begging and destitution, whilst praying for the collapse of Bolshevik power. As the situation deteriorated in 1918, her mother searched for a job. Initially there were no jobs for 'princesses', but eventually she became a cook in a water-works in Rublevo, near Moscow. As a child, Meshcherskaia noted that she found it harder to adapt initially, finding the poverty incomprehensible and the future bleak. Her mother was far too busy with the unusual manual work to waste time worrying. The situation slowly improved; the management realised that her mother was literate and moved her into a supervisory role, whilst Meshcherskaia, although young, was able to earn money as a piano teacher. After little more than a year, they returned to Moscow, the mother to sing and give singing lessons, whilst Meshcherskaia continued to teach music. 30 In the early 1920s, Meshcherskaia wrote that while she regretted the October Revolution as she had lost many family members, she welcomed the opportunities that it provided. She was no longer expected to follow noble traditions and simply become a good wife; she could now lead a more satisfying life. In her later memoirs, she argued that she and her mother 'adapted', even if forced by events; useful employment changed them and the way that others perceived them. 31 Nevertheless, the overall impression is less clear cut. Their relationship with other social groups appears problematic, based as it was on a need to hide their privileged past. Equally, her mother's transformation into a worker was clearly an unwilling one: 'useful' employment may have changed them, but the opportunity to return to Moscow was seized with both hands. The greater prominence posed dangers, but the work promised to be easier and more acceptable, drawing as it did on existing educational skills and cultural interests. By then, seven Bobrinskois, eleven Golitsyns and six Trubetskois were in residence. 32 Bogoroditsk did provide security, although this diminished over time. Individuals obtained range of jobs with the rations and money earned helping to support the young and the old who could not work. A couple worked for local government in the health and land departments; several taught music, languages and other subjects in schools; whilst others found office-work. 33 The impression gained was that the family was of great help; rations and payments often failed to materialise, forcing the 'colony' to barter to obtain food from peasants. Sometimes bartering was hard and unsuccessful; sometimes there was nothing to barter; and sometimes individuals fell ill, with typhus being rampant. Yet, there were always family members willing to help. The situation changed, of course: initially (summer 1918) servants remained, and milk and food were easily available. 34 Towards the end of 1918, the Bolshevik threat grew steadily. These communities provided a degree of stability and facilitated the continuance of old practises and traditions alongside new concerns and worries. In Bogoroditsk, the young continued to be educated, usually by other family members. Sergei learned French from his grandmother and was also taught by his aunt, going elsewhere for the rest of his lessons with three of his relatives. In addition, cultural interests were pursued with an intensity that suggested that they were an escape from everyday fears and a therapeutic link to the past. These nobles dominated local events: they organized plays, operettas, reading circles and art shows. It was done openly, involving local intelligentsia such as teachers and administrators, and available to the public.
Occasionally they even made money. Culture was 'ingrained' in their lives: it kept the family together, preserved their identity and provided a breath of fresh air from everyday life. 37 As Sergei admitted, they benefited hugely from the benign attitude of local Bolsheviks. Throughout these early years, therefore, there was a great deal of change, but it rarely involved 'becoming Soviet'. All Russians struggled to survive and the biggest changes arose from everyday life; the need to find employment, food and housing, all of which were rarely concerns for nobles prior to 1917. By persecuting former nobles for their 'non-toiling', 'exploiting' background, the regime encouraged nobles to think that work was the main way to become accepted into the new society, particularly since opportunities existed. Nobles possessed valuable skills. Most spoke foreign languages, had experience of military or civil service, had an education ranging from law to sciences, and had cultural skills (music, dancing, riding and more)
that new elites wanted to acquire. 42 The Bolsheviks could not create a workers' state overnight.
Most workers and peasants remained illiterate, inexperienced or both. The regime needed skilled individuals to fulfil the demands of a rapidly expanding bureaucracy. In the 1920s, around 20% of bureaucrats and technical personnel across the state were elements from the old regime. In the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, around 35% of its leadership in the 1920s had 'noble'
backgrounds and many more were in lower level posts. It was not until 1928 that many were expelled. 43 The military also desperately required experienced officers during the civil war and 13 thousands of ex-tsarist officers served into the 1920s. 44 Furthermore, the Bolsheviks struggled to implement their policies effectively. Around 11-12% of landowners managed to retain a foothold on their former estates, even in their manor houses, into the mid-1920s. In 1925, a new campaign was launched to remove them; some, apparently, were still hiring labour and using excessive amounts of land. Thousands were expelled but up to 40% survived until collectivization at the end of the decade. 45 Even then, nobles noted that they were forced from their estates as 'exploiters', simply to find work in local government in the nearest towns. 46 Former nobles found work at all levels, from manual work to the highest military and scientific positions. Some nobles worked for the state because they actively supported its aims and objectives, whilst a few probably hoped to sabotage it from within. Others were careerists who recognized the opportunities for personal advancement in a fledgling state. More still, especially in the military, were quick to stress that they saw service in terms of serving their country, rather than the regime. Generally, nobles accepted the Soviet work ethic, however unwillingly. They saw the logic in the need to work and younger generations increasingly knew nothing else. And they were quick to promote themselves as 'workers'. One former marshal of the nobility, protesting in 1918 about being classified as a bourgeois counter-revolutionary, argued that he was now a 'worker'. 47 Newly-working nobles resented being persecuted for their past, but the regime remained unwilling to accept that nobles could 'become Soviet': as the secret police stated in 1918 to Valentin Zubov (1885 -1969 , the Director of the Institute of the History of Art, 'it is true that you work for us, but all the same you're not really with us'. 48 For former nobles, the regime itself was too unstable at this stage to make it seem possible or necessary to forge new, long-term identities, whilst the past was too immediate to be completely rejected. Other members of Bogoroditsk community also saw the NEP as the dawn of a new era. Sergei Golitsyn's family moved back to Moscow in 1922, the year in which Sergei turned 13, hoping that he and his siblings could benefit from a better education in the capital. His siblings entered university and Sergei was enrolled at the school his sisters had attended before 1917.
Restrictions on entry had been lifted to accept males, but many of the old teachers remained and the education remained thorough. A rigorous interview process also remained. Although focused now on educational ability rather than social background, it undoubtedly removed less desirable elements of the population. Sergei was referred to as a burzhui [bourgeois] and suffered teasing, but he did not feel an outcast as other titled children also attended. In fact, only one boy in the class was from purely working-class parents. There were youth branches of the Communist Party (Pioneers for the younger children, Komsomol for the older ones), but primarily as vehicles for social activities and trips, such as one to Lenin's mausoleum not long after it opened. 50 As lishentsy, higher levels of education were officially forbidden but, as elsewhere, policies were implemented haphazardly. 51 Some nobles were refused access and a few émigrés from the early 1920s cite this as a reason for their departure. Petr Karpushko (b. 1900) moved to
Petrograd in 1922 to study in an institute there, but was refused entry on account of his background. His only chance of further study seemed to lie in emigration. 52 Others noted that 'as a rule' nobles were forbidden, before describing how they faced few problems. 53 Some used personal connections, bribery or concealed their social origins. 54 Lidiia Zemlianin (b.1914) was refused access to an institute in Moscow in 1930 (her father was an ex-tsarist officer and her stepfather was an engineer -a 'bourgeois specialist'). After working for five years as a seamstress and attending night school, she was finally accepted into university as 'worker' and studied geology. There she met her future husband, also a noble, who had worked as a coal miner before using his 'worker' status to gain entrance. Berezhnaia, despite an active role in Komsomol, was still refused access to university in 1930. She worked in an arms factory in Tula, becoming a shock-worker and party activist, before gaining entrance in the mid 1930s. 55 Nobles recognized that education could be a means of advancement in Soviet Russia. This was reflected in the changing choices of subject matter. Prior to 1917, law was the most popular subject at university for nobles, although few became lawyers. By the 1920s, more nobles were studying vocational subjects: Kirill Golitsyn gravitated towards architecture; Sergei Golitsyn towards accountancy; and Zemlianin to geology. The need to find jobs forced nobles to accept the vocational priorities of the regime. Nevertheless, older generations continued to stress traditional subjects to their children, even if they were forced to teach them in private. Young nobles studied music, ballet, dancing, literature, poetry, history and languages as before; Sergei
Golitsyn was reading Jules Verne, Shakespeare and Walter Scott, as well as Russian classics. 56 Equally, nobles of all ages saw cultural activities as an essential part of life. 57 They read Russian and European classics, and visited the theatre, ballet and opera whenever money allowed.
Aspects of traditional culture were championed by the regime at various times, but noble activities went much further. Figes argued that émigrés had two different notions of Russia; the land itself, and its culture and language. Continued involvement in the latter helped nobles to live anyway and remain Russian. 58 This feeling was shared by nobles within the Soviet Union. The government was alien to them, as was much of everyday life, but culture was a means to retain links to their past and their 'Russia'. It also provided material support. 59 The revolution destroyed old conventions preventing nobles from earning a profession from the arts. The Years of Terror, 1928 Terror, -1941 Although the attack on specialists in 1928 affected many nobles, the 1930s heralded a succession of more substantial threats. According to Meshcherskaia, 1933 was the darkest year yet due to new internal passports. 79 There were already restrictions on movement, but in December 1932 internal passports were introduced as further means of controlling the population. This policy was implemented throughout 1933. Initially affecting a few major cities, by the end of the 1930s it had spread to 37 cities and industrial centres, as well as frontier zones. Thousands were denied passports or fled to avoid applying for them; a sizeable proportion of the 3% denied in Moscow and as many as 10% in Kiev and Baku were former nobles. 80 Meshcherskaia and others, including Meiendorf, were refused passports, imprisoned and forced to wait before reapplying. 'former people' were targeted in total. 82 Skriabina described a 'purge' in the government institution where she worked, which removed many with undesirable pasts. She escaped, but a former landowner was arrested and exiled from their communal flat. She felt the need to hang a picture of V. M. Molotov, the Soviet leader whose real name was Skriabin, on their wall to foster doubts about her family's connections, even though Molotov was no relation. She wrote that by the end of these arrests the composition of the city changed, reflecting the arrests of friends and acquaintances. 83 Most were exiled or imprisoned, but worse fates were possible. Raevskii and his Many moved cities to try and utilize their skills, hobbies or personal connections to earn a living. 86 Yet, despite this, they had been 'discovered' by the regime.
Nevertheless, by the Great Terror in 1937-38, nobles were just one of numerous social groups, including the Communist leadership, who were affected. Indeed, the state recognized the changing nature of its search for enemies. Officially, the new constitution of 1936 stated that the regime had emerged victorious against class enemies and it restored the right to vote to everyone.
Some nobles hoped that this constitution would prompt dramatic changes, but their hopes were largely 'theoretical' 87 ; there was a relaxation in rationing and restrictions on education, but terror quickly gathered pace elsewhere. 88 This was inevitable -after all, the discussions over a new constitution began at the same time as the campaign against 'former people' in Leningrad. For nobles at least, state policies remained largely unchanged prior to 1941. Indeed, Sergei Golitsyn argued that whilst 1937 had the greatest impact on the whole country and upon historical memory, the years immediately after 1917 and even 1935 were worse for nobles. childhood, but family stories made her aware of the trauma of the revolution. In addition, her life seemed to be dominated by the word 'former': 'I used to hear the word former at every step. We got our bread at the former Filippov store, bought meat at the former Eliseev…Professor Ivanov, who lived in our house, was known as the former palace doctor…and Grandma was simply a "former person." When was all of this and what had it been like? I often asked Grandma these questions, and it turned out that it had all ended very recently -about ten or twelve years ago.
And yet it was so unlike everything that surrounded me!' 90 Periodically, her mystical past came back to haunt her. The obvious example from her schooldays came in October 1932, when Tolstaia was refused entry into the Pioneers. One of the children's parents had known her family when they had all lived in Baku during the civil war.
Tolstaia's parents were accused of mixing with intellectuals now condemned by the regime and, moreover, her grandmother spoke fluent French and had translated French poems. The latter was not such a problem -all knowledge could be used 'in the service of the revolutionary class', as one classmate grandly stated. But dubious acquaintances, few of whom Tolstaia actually knew, were a real problem. It was suggested that she could 'disassociate' herself from her parents'
'incorrect actions', but she would not. Tolstaia was 'terribly ashamed' and embarrassed, vowing never to return to school. Tolstaia's family quickly found out. Her father refused to act, probably aware of the dangers of drawing attention to the family, whilst her mother was too busy. Her grandmother ended up resolving the dispute, ending up with a seat on the parents' committee. 91 Tolstaia was proud to wear the red scarf of the Pioneers and stand with her classmates in celebrations marking the anniversary of the revolution and so on. As with Sergei Golitsyn in the 1920s, these organizations were the nearest that children got to a social life in the 1930s. They were the only safe way of gathering and provided a range of educational and social opportunities.
As befitted her youth, she did not connect these bodies, in which she mixed with her friends, with political events. Thus, in 1937, Tolstaia jumped at the chance to go to a Pioneer summer camp in the Crimea, where she saw the sea for the first time, and went hiking and kayaking. In the same year, her father was arrested in the purges because of his social origins, her mother was forced to leave her job in journalism, and the family's material position worsened. In the autumn, this was 25 all pushed to one side in the excitement of starting new school term. In her account, Tolstaia seemed surprised by these memories of such a significant year. 92 Tolstaia's account, therefore, reflects her ambiguous position. Her parents continued to stress old values; they considered that going to the theatre was 'a necessary element of a proper education', as were private ballet lessons, art school and an emersion in literature. She read Russian and European works in the late 1930s, from Pushkin, Bely and Akhmatova, to Dickens, Thackery and Stendahl. 93 This was vital in raising a 'well rounded human being'. 94 To be sure, It is also worth noting that, almost forty years after the revolution, Andrei Trubetskoi married into another illustrious old noble family, the Golitsyns, thereby continuing centuries of links between the two families. Marriage patterns are difficult to quantify given the sporadic evidence. It has been argued that former nobles continued have higher expectations of potential marriage partners throughout this period; even if they were non-nobles, they tended to be well educated or artistically inclined. 99 This argument, based on a handful of interviews, is difficult to substantiate, but of twenty or so nobles discussed in this piece who married during this period, over half married other nobles, whilst several married non-nobles and the rest are unknown. Most non-noble partners were well-educated or artistic figures.
On the one hand, this seems surprising, as it would have been safer to marry lower social
classes. There are, of course, examples of this happening; Berezhnaia married a worker, whilst
Meshcherskaia entered into a sham marriage for protection in the 1930s. 100 Mostly this arose 27 from the breaking down of social barriers -as was the case with Bashkirov -rather than a conscious desire to marry someone from a different background. On the other hand, given that many nobles lived, worked and socialized together, as noted above, it seems hardly surprising that a significant number also chose to marry each other. They shared common experiences and fears, and ultimately had the same beliefs and interests. Marriage helped to preserve these beliefs and to transfer them across generations, aiding continuity over change.
Some nobles directly discussed marriage in their accounts. As noted earlier, Skriabina's engagement to a former baron in 1937-38, then a composer, was welcomed wholeheartedly by her mother and grandmother, impressed by the groom's lineage. Looking back, Obolenskaia recognized that it was wonderful for her mother, after a hard day's work as a typist with people she would never have known prior to 1917, to spend an evening discussing cultural subjects in French, German, and English. Obolenskaia married young, not yet eighteen, but her family knew that they would struggle to find anyone as acceptable again. 102 Many younger nobles also aspired towards getting married 'properly', and this included a suitable bride and church service. Andizhan. The local youth were 'extremely vulgar, endlessly democratic, uncultured, and poorly educated. It will end with my having the type of son-in-law that would be a disgrace to display to any decent person.' He noted that 'there is not a single appropriate suitor' in the whole city. He feared his daughters would therefore 'naturally' be enticed by some inappropriate ones. 104 Ultimately, a 'good' marriage was essential if former nobles were to retain a distinct identity. Vera Nilaev explicitly stated this, but her efforts ended in vain as many undoubtedly did.
Losing the family house in Moscow after the revolution, she fled, with her four children, to the family's dacha. Her husband having died, she worked hard to maintain the family, rearing chickens and rabbits in the dacha's garden, and working at a local factory. Yet, escaping to the countryside backfired. Her three sons all ended up marrying illiterate rural girls. Although Nilaev recognized that they were good mothers, she saw the marriages as misalliances. As the family's material position worsened, the marriages were another factor that made the younger generation indistinguishable from the village population (just as it did for Bashkirov, described above, when he married a peasant girl). Other blows came when one of her sons abandoned religion as two of his children died of illness, whilst another son succumbed to alcoholism. Nilaev's worse fears had been realised; by the 1940s-1950s, the men were all factory workers and the women were all cooks or childminders. There was no sign of the family's past. 105 29
Conclusion
This article aimed to analyse levels of continuity and change in the activities and beliefs of former nobles during this period to examine the extent to which they were 'becoming Soviet'. In the end the picture remains mixed. Russians in some way. Most obviously, nobles became workers. By the 1930s, most former nobles had held several jobs, often in more than one region of the USSR and in all areas of the labour market: government officials, officers, factory workers, teachers, scientists, painters, builders and so on. They also changed their living habits, sharing communal flats, eating whatever was available and struggling for money.
Looking at these issues, Smirnova argued that former nobles were able to 'integrate' into Soviet society, but found the process complex and varied, whilst their social past was always a threat. 106 But did this mean that they had 'become Soviet'? Golitsyn and Skriabina believed so, whilst Meshcherskaia also highlighted work as the main element of change. Contemporary petitions suggest that nobles increasingly saw themselves as 'workers' once they had got a job.
This, they believed, entitled them to acceptance in the new state. And in some respects, their arguments are justified given the regime's emphasis on the duty of all Russians to work and to be productive citizens. In the state's eyes, though, former nobles remained tainted by their social past and the views that this past was supposed to foster. The state expected more; as well as being workers, it wanted Russians to reshape their beliefs and practises. Many nobles undoubtedly did, like Berezhnaia, but many others did not. These nobles, including Golitsyn and Skriabina, continued many traditional practises in terms of education, culture, religion and other elements.
Some historians have argued that the regime undertook a 'great retreat' in the 1930s, embracing many of these elements itself as it restored the primacy of the family, traditional educational practises and so on. 107 This has been heavily debated and there is certainly no sense that the regime approved of the activities of nobles described above. Moreover, even in the late 1930s, many children of former nobles were growing up in a distinct environment from other children, even if their material position was the same or worse.
There were, of course, differences within the examples discussed above. Older nobles were less dynamic than younger nobles. The focus in their accounts is strongly on survival, whereas younger nobles stress their desire to build 'ordinary' lives. The young are always better able to adapt; it was easier for them to find work and cope with everyday life. Moreover, those coming of age during the NEP were encouraged by the opportunities that it seemed to provide and were more likely to accept the permanency of the regime. Otherwise, though, the differences were less pronounced than might be expected. Older nobles continued social and cultural practises largely because they were ingrained, but increasingly many younger nobles adopted them as well. Equally, the experience of men and women are not as distinct as some have suggested. Oral evidence suggested that it was easier for women to adapt; they posed a smaller political threat, it was easier for them to retrain, and they could marry into new elites. 108 The examples above do not support this to any great extent. Most female nobles also experienced imprisonment and exile during this period. Most struggled as much as men to adapt to jobs, given few of them had worked prior to 1917. Few showed any more inclination to marry lower social 31 classes than men. There may have been bigger distinctions between nobles living in the cities, especially Leningrad and Moscow, and those living in rural Russia. Bashkirov and Nilaev provide the only evidence of the latter here, but both suggest that it was harder for former nobles to retain a distinct identity in rural Russia. The elements stressed by nobles elsewhere -culture, education and social interaction -were hard to maintain in Russia's vast countryside.
Ultimately, nobles retained the strong division between the public and the private that many Russians did. Fitzpatrick has argued that all Russians reinvented themselves and their history to create a self (or a public mask) that could survive the dangers and take advantage of the opportunities as no-one was immune from the repression. 109 Nobles agreed; as fon Mekk stated, everyone 'lived a double life, wearing a mask when outside our homes, taking it off only when we knew that it was safe to do so.' 110 In public, nobles became workers and refrained from opposition. Most did not believe in the regime, but it has been argued that many Russians inwardly rejected official values, even communists. 111 In private, nobles carried on with their lives. There were changes, but there were also strong elements of the past. By the 1930s, elements of change and continuity had combined to create a distinct identity for younger nobles.
Publicly, they could not be isolated from wider society and the country's ambitions but, privately, strong influences at home succeeded in transmitting traditional values and practises.
Many of these practises seem, in hindsight, to be risky, drawing unnecessary attention to former nobles at a time when this could prove fatal. Some, such as Panin, did see themselves as subverting the regime through their actions. Others would argue that one cannot suddenly stop believing in God, for example, especially given that they did not believe in Communism.
Equally, Fitzpatrick has observed a certain 'risk-taking' mentality among all Russians. There was not as much caution as one would expect because there was little evidence that caution guaranteed survival. 112 As the events of 1935 demonstrated, no matter where nobles worked, their background continued to haunt them. Moreover, when even loyal communists were being arrested, there was little incentive for nobles to dramatically change. In their accounts, the state is an ever-present factor that cannot be controlled and contemporaries accepted explanations that historians distrust; namely, that survival was often down to chance and luck.
In the end, though, certain practises and qualities were seen as being 'noble' and former nobles did not question continuing them. G. Kicheev (1906-78) did not enjoy the benefits of many of the former nobles described above. He lacked a good education and became a footballer and then a chauffeur. But, conscious of his roots, in the words of his son, he acquired 'aristocratic' traits -that is, he educated himself, read foreign literature and historical works, and took up cultural pursuits such as music. Just as new Soviet elites had tried to acquire the 'elite' skills after 1917, Kicheev believed that noble attributes could be reclaimed. 113 Rather than 'becoming Soviet', many former nobles simply wanted to remain themselves. Many were surprisingly successful, suggesting that continuity played a significant role alongside change in early Soviet society.
